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Introduction 
As part of a wide-ranging and radical reappraisal of the relation between the linguistic and the extra-
linguistic in the mind of the competent speaker-hearer, Lepore and Stone (2015) (L&S, hereafter) 
offer a characterisation of the so-called ‘semantics/pragmatics distinction’ under which 
conversational implicature (CI) phenomena, traditionally classed as ‘pragmatic’, are explained in 
terms of linguistic or grammatical conventions; that is, CI, at least in some cases, is part of linguistic 
competence proper, not mere general rationality. L&S offer many other radical moves against the 
prevailing consensus. While I applaud their boldness, I shall raise some foundational and more 
particular concerns for their project, especially as it bears upon what I think is the correct way to 
proceed in matters linguistic, i.e. syntax should come first. 
 
First, I shall present what I consider to be a highly robust way of drawing the semantics/pragmatics 
distinction in terms of what is proper to language itself and that which is constituted partly by non-
linguistic cognition. I shall dub my favoured position, the syntax-first conception. The virtue of this 
position is not so much that it is obviously true or smoothly plots what others have said on the 
matter, but rather that it is robust, i.e. it provides clear semantic/linguistic invariances across a range 
of phenomena by fixing on what appears to be an independently established invariant factor in 
determining what is said, viz. syntax. The cost of beginning with syntax, as it were, is relinquishing a 
propositional conception of semantics, i.e. semantics, understood as a class of language-specific 
properties readable from syntax, fixes constraints upon what can be said with an utterance (qua 
token of a linguistic type), but does not determine a truth-evaluable content as what is said. It will be 
seen, pace L&S, how a notion of CI as essentially a non-linguistic phenomenon follows 
straightforwardly from this conception, for CI rests upon a notion of what is said, which itself is a 
pragmatic notion. 
 
Secondly, to buttress the above abstractness with a concrete case, I shall critically discuss L&S's 
attempted convention-based explanation of speech act CIs. The conclusion will be that such CIs are 
syntactically constrained, but remain non-linguistic. 
 
The Syntax-First Conception of the Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction 
Standardly, the semantics/pragmatics distinction is understood as marking dimensions of fixity and 
freedom that go to determine what can be said with a token of a sentence type. Think of semantics 
here as a designation of properties of linguistic types that contribute to what is said with a token of 
the relevant type; being properties of types, they constitute invariances over what is sayable with 
tokens. Think of pragmatics as designating other ingredient factors that contribute to what is said. 
These factors will mark variances in interpretation turning on speakers' intentions and other 
prevailing non-linguistic factors that a speaker may intend a hearer to recognise, or simply 
presuppose. It doesn't follow from this bare distinction, of course, that pragmatics is an 
unconstrained mess, a bucket for whatever is not linguistic proper. On the contrary, I assume that 
one can have more or less detailed theories of pragmatic processes, and that such processes may 
operate under a linguistic licence. The only crucial point for the present discussion is that the upshot 
of such processes in the form of a truth-evaluable content is not linguistically obligatory. Consider 
(1): 
 (1) Mary shot the elephant in her pyjamas. 
(1) is multiply ambiguous depending (inter alia) on the interpretation of her, which may be 
construed as co-referential with Mary, the elephant, or as deictically valued by way of a contextually 
salient individual. For a speaker to say something with a token of (1), therefore, involves settling on 
the value of her, which, sans any extra assumptions, the type (1) does not fix. The assignment of a 
value (a propositional constituent for a saying) belongs to the realm of pragmatics. The linguistic 
type alone, however, fixes many features that the pragmatics cannot trump. Her is a singular, 
feminine nominal, so whatever value it does have must be a female individual. The content of the 
other lexical items is similarly constrained, even granting some polysemy as regards shoot (the 
object of shoot can be a target or a projectile). Furthermore, the syntax utterly constrains 
interpretation: Mary is the shooter (AGENT) and the elephant is the thing shot (PATIENT), not the 
other way around. The basic thought, therefore, is that linguistic competence alone—a knowledge 
of English, if you like—will severely constrain what can be said with a token of (1), but not fix any 
particular truth-evaluable content, for her remains free (albeit constrained) to vary in its 
contribution to what is said. Assume that a similar partition of the invariant and variant obtains 
generally. The open question across an indefinite range of cases is what features of interpretation 
count as invariant (semantic, linguistic proper) and variant (pragmatic, extra-linguistic). 
 
The question just flagged is nigh-on invariably approached by intuitions concerning the range of 
contents a given linguistic type can support across variations of context. Thus, if the content of a 
tokened type varies as a function of context of utterance (extra-linguistic factors), then no such 
content is fixed by linguistic competence alone, which is an invariant condition on what can be said. 
Crudely speaking, at one end of the spectrum is minimalism, which holds that any token of a well-
formed declarative sentence is apt to express a content thanks just to its being of that linguistic type, 
the exceptions being well-behaved and under a linguistic licence, such as pronouns (and temporal-
spatial adverbials, etc.) (cp., Borg, 2004; Cappelen and Lepore, 2005). The minimalist need not claim 
that such a minimal content is normally or even likely to be expressed by a relevant sentence token; 
her claim is only that the semantic properties of the type suffice to fix such a content, which 
speakers might eschew for linguistically extraneous reasons. At the other end, is a motley collection 
of long-held views variously labelled contexualist or pragmatist, unified by the claim that what is said 
with a linguistic token is underdetermined by linguistic properties (cp. Ziff, 1972; Travis, 1975; 
Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Recanati, 2004; Pietroski, 2003). An advocate of such a position need not 
insist that every conceivable sentence underdetermines a content; the minimalist, for instance, 
might be right about highly regimented discourses. The pragmatist only insists that 
underdetermination is the typical case and can be seen to hold systematically across a range of 
diverse constructions. Similarly, the pragmatist should not so much as entertain the idea that 
pragmatic processes have a free rein in their contribution to the fixing of a content; on the contrary, 
absolute constraints will issue from whatever the language alone determines. As we just saw with 
(1), syntax and lexical content fix invariant features of what is said, which no pragmatic or extra-
linguistic process will affect. 
 
As intimated in my introduction, although I think pragmatism is true, the position is not best 
articulated as a species of mere intuition mongering, where one is offered a ton of examples and 
told, ‘Look! Linguistic properties alone fail to fix a content in this case and that case, for what is said 
with these tokens differs from what is said with those tokens, so the type-level linguistic properties 
don't fix what is said’. In the present dialectic, such an exhortation is less than compelling for two 
basic reasons. Firstly, the minimalist doesn't deny the relevant phenomena, for what is said is 
characteristically underdetermined by the properties of the linguistic type. The crucial issue is 
whether there is a type-level content, a question left open by a demonstration that tokens of a given 
type can support varied contents. Secondly, for all a range of examples show, the linguistic type 
might well encode the variation of content at the level of the tokens by way of a more articulated 
covert sentence type as is familiar from linguistic theory. The syntax-first conception is designed to 
meet these concerns. The conception amounts to a view of the relation between syntax and its 
interpretation (the syntax/semantics interface), and how this relation enters into fixing a notion of 





I: Syntax: invariant structural conditions on how lexical items can be interpreted in relation 
to each other. Covert items are happily indulged, but require a syntactic licence, i.e. the item 
fixes a witnessed invariant interpretation (e.g. PRO, trace/copy, covert functional heads, 
etc.).1 
II: Semantics (= linguistic meaning): whatever syntax (+ licensed lexical content, if any) fixes 
for the potential content of what a speaker may literally say with a linguistic token; such 
meaning is characteristically less than truth conditional, because (i) syntax does not fix all 
truth/reference relevant relations within a projection and (ii) lexical items as projected will 
classify in terms of their structural role, not any external significance.2 
Putting these claims together, we arrive at four basic hypotheses concerning the 
semantics/pragmatics interface and the position of the notion of what is said: 
 
(i) Syntax determines linguistic meaning as an invariance of interpretation. 
(ii) What is said is not fixed by linguistic meaning, but is constrained by it as a type-level 
invariance on what can be said with linguistic tokens of the types. 
(iii) The extra ingredients of what is said issue from extra-linguistic factors pertaining to 
context/concepts/speaker intentions. 
(iv) Without further notice, CIs will not be part of linguistic meaning, because they are 
not invariances—trivially, because CIs operate on what is said (literal meaning), 
which itself is not an invariance. Some implicatures might be included as part of 
linguistic meaning (cp. Chierchia, 2004, on scalar cases), but that will because they 
have a specific syntactic/lexical licence. 
So, pragmatism is true, not so much because of the abundance of content supported by single 
linguistic types, although this is the case, but because the type-linguistic properties are too sparse to 
fix a single truth-evaluable content across indefinitely many cases. Furthermore, any would-be 
covert item whose value is such as to deliver a content for its host is obliged to have a linguistic 
licence (cp. Collins, 2007). After all, it is not a priori true that language alone delivers content. 
 
L&S propose a radically distinct conception of the role of grammar in contributing to content. My 
focus will be on the so-called ‘speech act implicature’. 
3. The Speech Act CI 
Familiarly, (2) gives rise to what is traditionally thought of as a request/imperative CI: 
(2) Can I have the French toast? 
The standard reasoning is as follows. Can expresses a modality of ability or permissibility in the sense 
that the declarative form X can F expresses the proposition that X is able or allowed to F. Thus, when 
the form is transformed into an interrogative, the reading should be retained, such that Can X F? is 
asking after the ability or permissibility of X to F. As it is, (2) is not read as a simple polar 
interrogative to which a waiter, say, may happily respond with ‘Yes’; were he to do so, one would 
consider him to be non-co-operative, or simply obtuse. Rather, (2) is used to make a 
request/imperative speech act clad in the syntactic garb of an interrogative. The intended speech act 
is communicated because speaker and hearer assume the same standards of communicative 
rationality, and the hearer is able to ‘calculate’ that the speaker is being polite, by making a request 
in the form of a question: the request is a conversational implicature rationally inferred on the basis 
of the semantically/grammatically encoded interrogative meaning in order to save the speaker's 
communicative cooperation. That is the standard story, more or less. In opposition to this picture, 
L&S suggest that can is ambiguous/polysemous between an ability and a request reading. Thus, the 
request option is part of the grammar, not a matter of general rationality realized by way of CI 
reasoning. 
 
(SFC) does not a priori adjudicate on this issue, but instead leaves it open whether this or that aspect 
of communicated content is linguistic or not, and, indeed, whether a supposed CI phenomenon is 
genuinely extra-linguistic or grammatically encoded. The conception, however, does impose two 
general conditions that pertain to the case at hand. Firstly, since CIs operate on what is said, which is 
not typically linguistically encoded, CIs can't be typically grammatical. The point here is that even if 
one is minded to think that the speech act CI is actually grammatical, the case will not generalise in 
the absence of a general account of how what is said is grammatically fixed. (2) is a convenient 
example, in this regard, because the force of a sentence is easily marked grammatically, such as by 
the movement of the auxiliary verb can to sentence-initial position. On the other hand, no linguistic 
feature will fix the referent of Sally's car, the brick factory, hand axe, and so on indefinitely across 
the nominal domain. What is sayable by way of these nominals is not fixed as a linguistic matter, but 
CI's can still be run on their basis, once what is to be said is settled on a particular occasion. This, 
however, is a general complaint, which L&S do not address. In other work, Lepore (Cappelen and 
Lepore, 2005) does, of course, seek to show that each declarative sentence expresses a minimal 
proposition, but that is not germane. The present point is that CI's operate on what is said, which on 
no-one's account is exhausted by minimal propositions. If that is so, then CIs just can't be 
grammatical as things stand. A second consideration imposed by (SFC) is addressed by L&S. 
 
If some feature of content is to be attributed to language (/grammar), then it must have a linguistic 
explanation; it can't be parachuted in just for the sake of rendering the relevant feature linguistic. 
It is to L&S's credit that they seek to show that the speech act CI is in fact grammatical. If an 
argument along such lines can be produced in general, then the worry just raised above is made 
void, for CIs will be shown not to operate on what is said after all, but by way of the relevant 
grammatical features. I think the prospects for this general strategy are generally gloomy precisely 
because all of what is said, insofar as a recognized CI can run off it, would need to be explained 
grammatically—an impossible task. The job of explaining CIs on top of that in a similar fashion 
squares the impossibility, as it were. 
 
Still, all of that said, as mentioned, the request CI is a convenient case, precisely because force can 
be grammatically marked. Even here, however, the reasoning offered by L&S fails to deliver the 
intended results. 
3.1 The Role of Please 
Consider the cases in (3): 
(3)a Please turn the music down. 
   b Please can I have the French toast? 
   c I would like to have the eggs benedict please. 
   d I'd like a drink please. 
   e #I'm thirsty please. 
The phenomena here indicate that please associates with a request, where the clause can wear its 
request character on its sleeve, as with the imperative form in (3a), or be somehow an indirect 
request as with the respective interrogative and declarative forms in (3b–d). The problem case is 
(3e), where it seems as if the attachment of please is anomalous because I'm thirsty does not 
support a request/imperative construal. On the face of it, then, please must find a place in the 
structure that is sensitive to whether the clause it attaches to is a request or not. As L&S (2014, p. 
101) write: 
 
What is please latching on to? It seems like please can accompany requests, as long as they are 
marked as requests in the usual way, rather than left implicit … please is diagnostic of a level of 
linguistic representation in which direct and indirect requests have the same status. This argues that 
[CI premises involving requests] are not just associations but are part of the speakers' grammars. 
If this reasoning is on the right lines, then we have a nice argument for the grammatical status of 
requests that cuts across the distinction usually employed in the CI analysis; that is, being a request 
does not merely amount to having an imperative form, and so a non-imperative form employed as a 
request is not necessarily a CI. If one thought that all non-imperative requests were cases of CI, then, 
without further ado, the differential attachment of please would be unexplained. Thus, the 
ambiguity alternative to CI is supported, in that the same term, such as can, may surface in requests 
and ability questions, the difference marked by the possibility of the attachment of please (inter 
alia). The reasoning, however, is non-compelling. 
 
Please functions as a marker that the speaker is imposing, and so is asking, in effect, for a favour, 
following the general maxim: in conversation, Don't Impose! It is equivalent to a if it would please 
you adjunct, although, as we shall see, it doesn't pattern syntactically as such, for it can append to 
polar interrogatives. The effect is clear in Spanish, which doesn't have please, but por favor (‘Do me 
a favour’). If that is right, then please should be able to append as an adverbial adjunct to any clause 
(restrictions will be discussed anon), so long as the context makes it clear that the speaker takes 
themselves to be imposing. This is borne out. (4), for instance, is fine in a context where answering 
the question is construed as an imposition. Thus, an interrogative becomes a request with the 
appendage of please: 
 
(4) Is two plus two four please? 
The point generalises to any interrogative. It is not that please attaches to a clause otherwise 
marked as a request, or is diagnostic of such a clause, but rather that the adjunction renders the 
clause as a request, because please is indicating that the speaker acknowledges that the provision of 
an answer is an imposition. The same goes for declaratives, too, so long as the context makes it clear 
that the speaker is making an imposition upon an interlocutor. Thus, (3e) can be rendered fine: 
 
(5) A: What would you like? Food or drink? 
    B: I'm thirsty please 
Here, in the context, the speaker's being thirsty amounts to an imposition, given the understanding 
that the speaker's thirst is to be quenched by the hearer. Of course, such a story grades off in 
plausibility where the declarative invites no response that is an imposition. For instance, Paris is the 
capital of France please makes little sense off the bat, because no action is invited that is an 
imposition. One could make sense of the utterance, however, as an answer to a choice, much like in 
(5). 
 
In general, then, far from please suggesting that the CI account of speech acts is in error, its free 
distribution under syntactic constraints supports the CI account, for there appears to be no level of 
analysis whereby interrogatives or declaratives are constituted as requests, or at least no such level 
revealed by the distribution of please. Thus, if one wants to form a request sans an imperative form, 
grammar alone will not do the job. 
 
Purely syntactic considerations point in the same direction. Thus, please can appear anywhere 
outside of the vP and TP domains: 
 (6) a Please turn the music down/Turn the music down please. 
   b [FOR Please [FOR can [FIN you] [TP < you > <can > turn the music down]]]3 
   c [FOR [FOR Can [FIN you] please [TP < you > <can > turn the music down]]] 
   d Can you [TP < you > <can > turn the music down] please? 
   e *Can you turn please the music down? 
   f *Can please you turn the music down? 
   g *Turn please the music down! 
The phenomena here indicate that please serves as an adjunct of force rather than an item selected, 
argument-like, given a grammatical organisation that encodes requests. Thus, (6b–d) witness that 
please can occur as an adjunct associated with FORCE outside of TP. Please, in other words, modifies 
the force of the clause, but, qua adjunct, leaves the force intact, rather than changes it to some 
other kind of request/imperative force. In (6e–g), it is witnessed that please can only adjoin in the 
FORCE domain. The same considerations, of course, apply to declaratives in that please can only 
occur initially or finally, for there is no movement to FORCE in such cases. There are some 
complications, however. 
 
Please is happy with imperatives + subject, but only after the subject: 
 
(7) a *Please everyone wait. 
   b Everyone please wait. 
It is not clear to me what these phenomena indicate. They don't so much refute the hypothesis 
made above as suggest that the marking of force in these cases is unclear. For (7b) is predicted, if we 
take the subject to move from SPEC-TP. It would then be as if (7b) is derived from (7a), but the 
purpose of such putative movement remains unclear. 
 
There is also a semantic effect. Please is OK as adjoined to a complement (non-finite or subjunctive) 
so long as the matrix verb is a speech-act verb: 
 
(8)a I asked/requested/implored him to please turn the music down. 
   b I asked/requested/implored that he please turn the music down. 
   c *I imagined/expected him to please turn the music down. 
   d *I prefer that he please turn the music down. 
It will be noted that please cannot occur outside of the embedded clause in (8a–b), either sentence 
initial or final positions, and please in such positions does not rescue (8c–d). It appears, therefore, as 
if please can be reported as part of the content of the speech act, if the act is of the right 
imperative/interrogative sort. Thus, the cases in (9) are not perfect: 
 
(9) a ?I said that he must please turn the music down. 
   c ?I wondered whether he would please turn the music down 
I think the considerations so far marshalled clearly indicate that please offers no support for the 
thought that can is ambiguous between an ability and a request construal, for there is no 
grammatical request level at which please selectively occurs. As just witnessed with (8–9), please is 
clearly semantically related to requests, and this has its grammatical signature, but none of this even 
intimates any grammatical level of requests. L&S, however, have other arguments. 
3.2 The Role of Able 
Consider: 
(10) Am I able to have the French toast? 
(10) is certainly an unhappy formulation of a request, and is awkward with please. Thus, L&S reason: 
 
English speakers somehow know that [Can I have the French toast?], rather than [(10)], is the 
ordinary formulation of an indirect request—and this factors strongly into how we produce and 
interpret utterances involving the terms … [T]his suggests that [CI request premises] are not 
associations, but are part of speakers knowledge of language (Lepore and Stone, 2014, p. 102). 
The thought is that if can univocally carries the standing able meaning, and no request meaning, and 
so can only be recruited for a request via CI, then, ceteris paribus, (10) should be able to serve as a 
request, but it can't, and is especially bad with please, or so goes the intuition of L&S. Thus, the use 
of can as a request signals that the auxiliary carries the request meaning rather than the request 
being a CI association. There are two problems with this line of reasoning. 
 
Firstly, the use of (10) as a request (with or without please) is at best stilted, rather than 
ungrammatical in any sense, and please, if adjoined, must be in a FORCE position. Secondly and 
more substantively, whatever oddity there is to (10) is independently explicable. If, as we are 
assuming, please registers the speaker's recognition of imposition, then the oddity of (10) + please 
follows from the imposition being explicitly cancelled with the semantically heavy able in distinction 
to the light auxiliary can. That is, there is no presumption on the speaker's part that the interlocutor 
can satisfy the intended request. The cases in (11) are equally stilted, although not entirely out, for 
the same reason, it appears: 
 
(11) a Would it be possible to have the French toast please? 
   b Do you still have French toast please? 
 
 
3.3 Ambiguity, the Very Idea 
 
L&S's idea, in general, is that speech act CI is really a case of ambiguity. L&S do not attempt to 
unpack this claim, but appear to assume that the work the claim may do offers enough justification 
for the hypothesis. There are, however, numerous tests for ambiguity that may be deployed, 
although it must be stressed that the tests are defeasible, especially given acceptable zeugmaticity. I 
take it that L&S win, as it were, if can comes out polysemous, even if not precisely ambiguous. 
Similarly, it is difficult to test for ambiguity in the case of auxiliaries, rather than nominals or lexical 
verbs, say. Still, consider the following case. Let's assume that (12a) has a default generic able 
reading, and, obviously enough, (12b) has a request reading: 
 
(12) a Can you love without selfishness 
    b Can you leave please 
 
If that is right, then their conjunctions should be unacceptable: 
(13) a Can you leave please and love without selfishness? 
    b Can you love without selfishness and leave please? 
To the contrary, both have a request construal as opposed to being ambiguous, unacceptable, or 
having a uniform able interpretation. Of course, if conjuncts, elliptical or otherwise, must have a 
joint construal, then this is predicted, but terms can't have a joint construal, if what is conjoined 
have respectively distinct resolutions, as we are assuming obtains between (12a) and (12b). The 
single construal, however, is perfectly in line with please adjoining as a FORCE adjunct that scopes 
over the conjunctions. The test works equally well without please, but its inclusion does make vivid 
that there is no anomalous effect from the putative ambiguity of can, and that the resolution always 
follows the request construal. 
 
4 Conclusion 
L&S are right to claim that communication involves everything and the kitchen sink, and so, a model 
comprising just ‘grammar’ and rationality is too simple. However, we may part company with what 
L&S model as part of the grammar. Further, my austere (SFC) alternative recognises the complexity 
while factoring what is said to be part of that complexity, a fortiori CI phenomena typically work on 
the basis of what is said in the absence of any grammatical account of the effect. Grammar 
constrains rather than fixes what we can say with language. For example, syntax constrains the 
position of please as an explicit marker of requests, but doesn't support a level of representation 
where requests are marked as such. Or so it seems. 
1 
My claim is that syntax provides at least such conditions on interpretation; it also provides much 
else, of course, such as the organisation of morphology and phonology at various levels. 
 
2 
On the first point, syntax will, for example, leave unspecified many relations of attribution that give 
rise to familiar cases of polysemy and ambiguity (red leaves, Mary's car, etc.). On the second point, 
lexical items will carry a great deal of information to which the linguistic system is insensitive. 
 
3 
The angled brackets mark positions unpronounced in the structure but occupied by copies of items 
that are copied or move higher up the structure to the left. Following ‘cartographic’ analyses, I 
assume that the clause has a left periphery with functional projections marking finiteness (FIN) and 
Force (FOR), and other features too, which are presently irrelevant, with copied items occurring in 
the SPECs of the projections. To take please to be an adjunct of FOR, is to position it so that it 
extends the FOR projection. There is precious little syntactic discussion of please, so the following 
remarks are my own, but for general discussion of this syntactic framework, see Rizzi, 1997, and 
Haegman, 2012. 
